Table of Contents
What does it mean to trust in epistemic authority?
3) An epistemic authority in a domain is a person (or an object (119), or even a strategy (115)) a conscientious person will let ‘stand in for’ her in her attempt to get the truth in that domain. (
What is meant by epistemic claim?
In a wide range of familiar cases, “epistemic” is used to indicate a teleological connection to knowledge – or to “epistemic goods” more broadly construed to include true belief, understanding, and the like (in as much as these are not species of knowledge).
What is the example of epistemic?
Examples of Epistemology There are three main examples or conditions of epistemology: truth, belief and justification. First of all, truth occurs when false propositions cannot be discerned. Consequently, in order for something to be considered as knowledge, it must be true in nature.
What is an epistemic state?
Epistemic states are linguistically expressed through the verbs of propositional attitude (believe, know, be convinced, have doubt, amongst many others). These denote the attitude (or state) of a subject to a proposition and are formulated by sentences of the form “S v that p” (v: propositional attitude verb).
What is zagzebski view on trusting other people?
Nevertheless, Zagzebski maintains that it is often the case that trusting another person provides one with a decisive reason to believe what they believe. Zagzebski extends the argument for general trust in others to particular trust in the faculties of others.
What is Deontic authority?
Someone’s “deontic authority” is their right to determine others’ future actions. It can be acquiesced to or resisted.
What is epistemic conscientiousness?
Zagzebski understands epistemic conscientiousness as the ‘quality of using our faculties to the best of our ability in order to get the truth’ (2012: 48). It is the state or disposition of being careful and doing our best.
What is epistemic violence?
Epistemic violence is a failure of an audience to communicatively. reciprocate, either intentionally or unintentionally, in linguistic exchanges. owning to pernicious ignorance. Pernicious ignorance is a reliable ignorance or. a counterfactual incompetence that, in a given context, is harmful.
What are the epistemic virtues?
Usually philosophers consider honesty and the following characteristics to be epistemic virtues: attentiveness, benevolence (principle of charity), creativity, curiosity, discernment, humility, objectivity, parsimony, studiousness, understanding, warranty, and wisdom.
What makes a character trait an epistemic virtue?
Epistemic virtue is a system of systems of dispositions. An epistemically virtuous person is someone who is determined to find out what’s true without having to question their own personal truth or be swayed by self-interest or feelings.
What are examples of epistemic injustice?
Common examples include sexism and racism. In such cases the testimony of a woman or a person from an ethnic minority background will be given deflated credibility, based on the prejudicial associations between that group and negative stereotypes.
What is the primary harm of epistemic injustice?
Under this model, the primary harm of testimonial injustice is defined as: being relegated to the role of epistemic other, being treated as though the range of one’s subject capacities is merely derivative of another’s.
What is Zagzebski’s argument for epistemic authority?
The second stage in Zagzebski’s argument for epistemic authority is to establish that we are rationally required to trust others’ faculties, and other people more generally. Her argument is one of consistency.
Is there such a thing as epistemic authority?
There are tellings that satisfy this condition (132), and thus there is a strong kind of epistemic authority, an authority which — like the political authority on which it is modeled — is compatible with our modern values of egalitarianism and autonomy, when these values are properly understood (see especially Chapter 1 and 11).
Is epistemic self-trust rational and inescapable?
To re-cap the main thread of the argument: 1) epistemic self-trust is both rational and inescapable, 2) consistent self-trust commits us to trust in others, 3) among those we are committed to trusting are some we ought to treat as epistemic authorities, and 4) some of these authorities can be in the moral and religious domains.